Spacetime is as spacetime does by Lam, Vincent & Wuthrich, Christian
Spacetime is as spacetime does
Vincent Lam and Christian Wu¨thrich∗
Abstract
Theories of quantum gravity generically presuppose or predict that the reality underlying rela-
tivistic spacetimes they are describing is significantly non-spatiotemporal. On pain of empirical
incoherence, approaches to quantum gravity must establish how relativistic spacetime emerges
from their non-spatiotemporal structures. We argue that in order to secure this emergence, it
is sufficient to establish that only those features of relativistic spacetimes functionally relevant
in producing empirical evidence must be recovered. In order to complete this task, an account
must be given of how the more fundamental structures instantiate these functional roles. We
illustrate the general idea in the context of causal set theory and loop quantum gravity, two
prominent approaches to quantum gravity.
Keywords: Emergence of spacetime, functionalism, empirical incoherence, causal set theory, loop
quantum gravity, local beables, constitution, multiple realizability.
1 Introduction
The main research programs in quantum gravity (QG) tend to show that standard relativistic
spacetime is not fundamental. The precise and different ways in which it is not fundamental depend
on the particular quantum theory of gravity under consideration, but they all seem to suggest a
radical picture according to which crucial spatiotemporal features (and possibly even space and
time themselves) are not part of the fundamental physical ontology (Huggett and Wu¨thrich ming).
This perspective raises two related families of philosophical worries (besides the many technical
difficulties that the various QG approaches have to face). The first concerns the very possibility
of empirical evidence, including the experimental confirmation of these theories themselves; after
all, it seems that all experimental data ultimately always amount to some physical object, such as
the ‘pointer’ of some measurement apparatus, having a certain position in space at a certain time.
Indeed, if space and time are necessary ‘preconditions’ of theory confirmation in empirical science,
then any theory denying the fundamental existence of spacetime undermines the very possibility
of its own empirical justification. Consequently, such a theory would seem empirically incoherent
(Huggett and Wu¨thrich 2013).
In most of the physics literature on quantum gravity, this challenge of empirical incoherence
largely amounts to the usual constraint of consistency with the superseded theories: in particular,
any theory of QG should recover in some appropriate regime the smooth relativistic spacetime
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picture of the theory of general relativity (GR).1 This consistency constraint is a central concern in
all quantum gravity programs and may typically involve approximations and limiting procedures
(Wu¨thrich 2017). In this perspective, the issue is mainly a technical one. However, from a more
philosophical point of view, the worry is that the consistency constraint is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the challenge of empirical incoherence to be met. To many, it remains
unclear in what sense quantities such as space and time can emerge from a fundamental non-
spatiotemporal ontology at all (Maudlin 2007; Lam and Esfeld 2013).
The second type of philosophical worries that may arise has to do with the very characterization
of the possibly non-spatiotemporal physical ontology. First of all, in order to describe a plurality of
physical entities in this context, a differentiation in spatiotemporal terms (according to which we
have a diversity of fundamental physical entities in virtue of their distinct spacetime locations) is
obviously not available within this framework. A related issue concerns spelling out compositional
and mereological relations in non-spatiotemporal terms (cf. Ney 2015).
Most importantly, it should be clarified what makes the non-spatiotemporal entities described
by QG concrete physical entities, rather than merely abstract mathematical ones. The standard
criterion for distinguishing the concrete from the abstract relies on spacetime itself: concrete entities
are in spacetime, abstract ones are not. Clearly, such a spacetime criterion is just not available for
characterizing a physical ontology of non-spatiotemporal entities. An alternative characterization
of concrete entities involves some notion of causal efficacy: concrete physical entities as opposed to
abstract mathematical ones can be considered as causally efficacious in some sense. However, at
first sight, it seems far from obvious how to make explicit a precise notion of non-spatiotemporal
causation (Lam and Esfeld 2013, §4.2).
Thus, the two standard criteria for concreteness, which rely on spacetime and causation respec-
tively, are not apt in the QG context (at least to the extent that this latter involves an ontology
of non-spatiotemporal entities). However, they together suggest a mixed strategy that combines
certain aspects of the two criteria: to focus on spacetime functions—that is, on spatiotemporal or
‘spacetime-like’ roles, in some broad functional rather than narrowly causal sense—the fundamental
entities may instantiate in favourable circumstances.
This paper aims to evaluate to what extent the tools of functionalism can help to alleviate
the worries mentioned above, with particular attention to the threat of empirical incoherence.
One central intuition we investigate is that spacetime need not be fully recovered in some strong
ontological sense—to be explicated below in section 2 and particularly in section 3—in order to
provide the grounds for empirical evidence and everyday experience, but only certain functionally
relevant features. We will argue that this functional approach offers a promising avenue towards
meeting the conceptual challenge of the ‘emergence of spacetime’ in QG.
Since the way in which spacetime is not fundamental in QG, and consequently the way in which
it emerges at a higher level depends on the specific program under consideration, this functionalist
strategy needs to be investigated in concrete cases. We focus in this paper on two important
research programs in QG: causal set theory (CST) and loop quantum gravity (LQG). These two
lines of research embody typical features that make the standard spacetime picture irrelevant at
the QG level, mainly in that they offer a view of fundamental non-metrical discreteness in the first
case, and quantum and combinatorial features in the second case. We will investigate to what
extent a functionalist perspective allows us to bridge the metaphysical gap between the structures
postulated by these theories and smooth classical spacetime as we find it in GR.
1Additionally, a theory of QG should of course come with an ontology that can accommodate evidence that goes
beyond that of superseded theories, but such an ontology will in general not be of straightforwardly four-dimensional
objects.
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Our functionalist project bears some similarities, as well as some dissimilarities, to related
approaches in recent philosophy of physics. Perhaps most prominently, a functionalist strategy has
been deployed in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics by David Albert (2013, Ch.
6) in defence of wave function realism and by David Wallace (2012) in support of an Everettian
interpretation. While their functionalism is concerned with recovering three-dimensional space and
its manifest content from the wave function by means of a functional characterization of spatial
dimensions, ours will be tasked with the emergence of four-dimensional spacetime, which renders
their crucial use of dynamics inapt for the present project.2
Closer to our concern is the spacetime functionalism of Eleanor Knox (2013, 2014, 2017), which
extends prior work by Harvey Brown (2006). Concerned with GR and rival classical theories, hers
is a functionalism which concludes in a spacetime substantivalism; semantic quarrels aside, since we
are interested in QG, where the fundamental structures are clearly less than fully spatiotemporal,
we prefer to say that spacetime emerges from the fundamental level and that this emergence is
precisely the relation that a functionalization is supposed to elucidate. Whether one ultimately
wishes to be a realist or an eliminativist about spacetime is orthogonal to our concern here.
Let us illustrate this. For Knox, something ‘plays the spacetime role’ and thus is spacetime
“just in case it describes the structure of the inertial frames, and the coordinate systems associated
with these” (2014, 15; cf. also Knox 2013). Since in GR it is the metric field which describes the
structure of the inertial frames, the metric just is the spacetime (and hence the substantivalism).
Since “[t]here is nothing in the functional definition of spacetime to suggest that the realizer of the
spacetime must be fundamental” (ibid., 18), she claims that her functionalism can straightforwardly
cope with the situation where spacetime emerges and GR is an effective, rather than a fundamental
theory. Thus, the idea is that whatever the fundamental degrees of freedom, they give rise to that
which realizes the role of inertial frames and hence spacetime; in other words, it assumes that
the realizers are emergent themselves. This immediately raises the question what the relationship
between these realizers and the fundamental degrees of freedom is supposed to be. Since this
relationship is then not touched by Knox’s spacetime functionalism, it is also not clarified by it.3
It is our declared goal to elucidate how spacetime can emerge from a non-spatiotemporal struc-
ture and what it might mean in a program in QG to secure this emergence. Thus, we wish to apply
functionalism one level deeper, as it were: for us, the realizers of the relevant spacetime functions
will be the fundamental degrees of freedom and their collective behaviour or structure. In fact,
pace Knox, these realizers have to ultimately be placed at the fundamental level, even though the
spacetime roles they play become apparent only at an effective scale. Furthermore, although we
appreciate Knox’s insistence on inertial frames, we want to enter our functionalist project with a
more flexible understanding of what spacetime roles there are to be filled.
Before discussing to what degree certain spacetime roles can be functionally instantiated in CST
(section 4) and LQG (section 5), we will consider the (dis)analogies with the debate about the role
of spacetime in the ontology of quantum mechanics (section 2) and with functionalist perspectives
2The functionalist approach about spacetime developed in this paper aims to constitute an interpretative strategy
for understanding (the emergence of spacetime in) quantum gravity; in this sense it also differs from Chalmers (2012)’s
functionalism about spatiotemporal features centred on perception.
3Knox’s functionalist is explicitly a realizer form of spacetime functionalism, which identifies spacetime with the
entity which instantiates the relevant functional role, rather than a role spacetime functionalism, which identifies
spacetime with the property of having certain properties that occupy the spacetime role. Although one may read our
article as an expression of this latter view, we remain uncommitted between the two. In fact, we wish to leave open
the possibility of resisting the dichotomy. We thank David Yates and an anonymous referee for pushing us on this
point. For a discussion of this distinction in the context of spacetime functionalism, see Yates (ming), who offers a
taxonomy of solutions to the problem of empirical incoherence, as well as an argument against the brand of realizer
functionalism found in Chalmers (2012).
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in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of the special sciences (section 3). Conclusions follow
in section 6.
2 Quantum ontology and spacetime
Some of the issues that quantum-gravitational theories ‘without spacetime’ have to face (see section
1) already arise in the context of the debate on the ontology of the realist ‘interpretations’ (or ‘ver-
sions’) of quantum mechanics (QM). Main examples of such realist ‘interpretations’ are Everettian
or many-worlds theories (MW), Bohmian mechanics (BM) and dynamical (spontaneous) collapse
theories, such as the theory of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW). This section aims to see what
can be learned from this debate for the QG context, highlighting the similarities and the differences
between the cases of QM and of QG.
The just mentioned interpretations are realist with respect to QM in the standard sense that
they take its central theoretical entity, namely the quantum state, or the wave function, to encode
objective features of the physical world. A crucial part of the debate on the ontology of these
realist interpretations of QM concerns the status of the wave function and the exact way in which
it encodes objective features.
At first sight, within this realist framework, the wave function is most naturally understood
as a concrete physical object (namely, a physical field), very much like the electromagnetic field
of Maxwell’s theory. However, there is a huge difference between this latter field and the wave
function of (many-particle) non-relativistic QM. Whereas the electromagnetic field lives on the
usual 3-dimensional space (or 4-dimensional spacetime), the wave function is defined on the 3N -
dimensional configuration space of QM, where N is the number of particles under consideration—
ultimately the total number of particles in the universe. From an ontological point of view, the
term ‘configuration space’ is a misnomer here, since there actually are no configurations of particles
in standard 3-dimensional space in this picture of the world but only the wave function living on
this very high-dimensional space and evolving in time. According to this straightforward realist
conception of the wave function (called ‘wave function realism’ or ‘wave function monism’; see
Albert 1996, 2015; Ney and Albert 2013), standard 3-dimensional space, which constitutes the
natural framework for classical physics and for empirical evidence in general, is simply not part of
the fundamental physical ontology.4 The challenge of how to account for empirical evidence in this
context is thus issued, since empirical data are intuitively understood as ultimately always involving
(what looks like) objects located in 3-dimensional space (such as the pointer of a measurement
apparatus) and evolving in time.
In this sense, there is a similarity between the case of QG without spacetime and the wave
function realist understanding of QM: in both cases, the fundamental ontology of the theory does
not explicitly include ordinary 3-dimensional space and entities localized in ordinary 3-dimensional
space, thereby posing a possible threat for the empirical coherence of the theory.5 Within the frame-
work of wave function realism, the worry is that the wave function living on a very high-dimensional
configuration space is not the right sort of entity to ground the 3-dimensional experimental evi-
dence that is commonly understood to empirically confirm QM in the first place. The fundamental
ontology of wave function realism does not contain any entities localized in ordinary 3-dimensional
space—what Bell calls ‘local beables’, i.e., the entities that exist according to the theory and that
4It is of course possible to include standard 3-dimensional space in the fundamental ontology of QM in addition
to the configuration space of the wave function; but this move would considerably inflate the ontology and raise the
issues of the relationship between these two spaces and of how things in these different spaces can seemingly interact.
5Elaborating on previous considerations by John S. Bell, Maudlin (2007, 2010) explicitly raises the threat of
empirical incoherence as an argument against wave function realism.
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“can be assigned to some bounded spacetime region” (1987, 53)—and so cannot rely on such local-
ized entities or local beables to account for experimental evidence.
In the context of wave function realism, an obvious strategy to address this issue of empirical
incoherence is to deny that local beables are required in the fundamental ontology in order to
ground experimental evidence. Albert (1996, 2013) precisely deploys this strategy, relying on a
functionalist understanding of ordinary objects localized in 3-dimensional space: these latter are
understood in terms of their causal and functional roles, that is, in terms of the causal and functional
relations they enter into.6 Albert then crucially argues that the dynamics of the wave function is
such that it can play the functional role of 3-dimensional situations (which are encoded in the form
of the Hamiltonian)—instantiating the right sort of functional relations—that constitute the basis
for empirical evidence (see also Albert 2015, ch.6).
As mentioned in the introduction, the functionalist strategy that this paper aims to investigate
in QG is partly inspired by the use of functionalist tools in the context of wave function realism.7
However, beyond the similarities between wave function realism and the QG theories ‘without
spacetime’, it is important to underline the fundamental differences between the two cases, in order
to better grasp the specific nature of the problem in QG. Most importantly, the QM context allows
for spacetime-based ontologies that constitute alternatives to wave function realism in a way that
is not straightforwardly available or legitimate in the context of QG.
Indeed, building on the work of Bell, research in the last decades has made clear that each
of the three main realist versions of QM (i.e. BM, GRW, MW) can be understood in terms of
an ontology of local beables (with a non-local dynamics), that is, an ontology of material entities
localized in (bounded regions of) ordinary 3-dimensional space (or 4-dimensional spacetime), such
as particles, point-like events (‘flashes’) or a matter density field.8 Such an ontological framework
of local beables has been called ‘primitive ontology’ in the recent literature (see Allori et al. 2008):
it is primitive in the sense that it is what makes up everything else (including empirical evidence)—
everything is ultimately constituted by elements in the primitive ontology. It is also primitive in
the sense that it is postulated from the start, rather than read off from the mathematical structure
of the theory (as, to some extent, wave function realism is).
The arguments in favour of the primitive ontology approach to QM mainly involve its explana-
tory structure: it aims at providing an explanatory framework within which familiar macroscopic
objects localized in 3-dimensional space, such as those involved in measurement outcomes, can be
understood in terms of (more) fundamental entities (particles, flashes, matter density field) that are
also localized in 3-dimensional space. In this sense, ordinary 3-dimensional space (or 4-dimensional
spacetime) provides an explicit and natural connection between the primitive ontology and what
can be observed at the familiar macroscopic level—such an intuitive connection is simply lacking
within wave function realism, which has to explain ordinary macroscopic objects that are (or seem
to be) localized in 3-dimensional space in terms of a fundamental entity that is not. The appeal
to functionalism aims precisely at providing such an explanatory connection in the case of wave
function realism. Establishing such a connection is pressing for the wave function realist, as the
alternative strategy of positing an ontology of local beables—to the extent that such an ontology
is available at all—can be argued to be more intuitive and natural, as an inference to the best
6“And the thing to keep in mind is that what it is to be a table or a chair or a building or a person is—at the
end of the day—to occupy a certain location in the causal map of the world. The thing to keep in mind is that
the production of geometrical appearances is—at the end of the day—a matter of dynamics.” (Albert 2013, 127,
emphases in original).
7See also Wallace (2012, ch.2)’s functional emergence of macroscopic structures (the ‘many worlds’) in his Everett
interpretation of QM.
8It has been argued in Allori et al. 2011 that this is the case even for some versions of MW.
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explanation. In particular, it is the ‘constitution’ or ‘building blocks’ aspect of such an ontological
framework (everything physical being ultimately made up of fundamental local beables) that can
be seen as more intuitive and natural than the functionalist perspective. Although the devil may
be in the details,9 the intuitive force of this argument for an ontology of local beables should not
be underestimated.10
Such an ontological framework of local beables fundamentally relies on spacetime and on lo-
calization with respect to spacetime. This obvious fact highlights a crucial difference about the
role of spacetime in the QM and QG contexts. In the former case, spacetime is not part of the
dynamical physical systems described by the theory, where a fixed, non-dynamical (though possibly
curved) spacetime structure is assumed from the start, whereas in the latter case (the geometry of)
spacetime itself is considered as a dynamical system, and therefore not fixed a priori. The various
research programs in QG actually investigate the very nature and status of spacetime itself, as well
as its relationship to matter, with the possibility of spacetime being non-fundamental considered
very seriously (see section 1). In this context, it seems neither legitimate nor methodologically ade-
quate to merely postulate from the start an ontological framework according to which the physical
systems described by QG are localized with respect to some fundamental spacetime structure or
in fundamental spatiotemporal terms (at least, in the standard sense of ‘spacetime’; see Lam 2015,
§7 and §9).11 Similarly, the intuitive appeal of the ‘constitution’ or ‘building blocks’ perspective
seems to vanish in a non-spatiotemporal context (what it can mean for something spatiotemporal
to be constituted by something non-spatiotemporal is obviously far from intuitive).
This leads us to another aspect of the difference between the QM and QG cases: there simply is
no issue about time in the ontology of QM. Both the wave function and the local beables evolve in
time, i.e. take time for granted within the ontological framework of QM. The dynamics of the wave
function actually plays a central role in Albert’s functionalist account of the everyday picture of the
world within wave function realism: the wave function on configuration space evolves in time in such
a way that it can play the functional role of 3-dimensional situations (see Albert’s quote in footnote
6). On the contrary, there is no such standard temporal evolution of fundamental physical systems
available in the QG context where space and time generally do not possess any fundamental status.
The difference between QM and QG on the issue of time is well illustrated by Ney (2015, §7), who—
while defending wave function realism against the charge of empirical incoherence—considers that
QG theories without time do face a “legitimate threat of empirical incoherence”, since standard
confirmation theories take confirmation as a fundamentally “diachronic process”: time, and above
all, change are necessary conditions for empirical confirmation. The idea here is that time is crucial
for the empirical coherence of a theory in a way that space is not. The functionalist strategy
that we investigate in this paper rejects this distinction between space and time with respect to
empirical coherence: it aims at applying the same functionalist understanding to both the spatial
and temporal features that are relevant for empirical confirmation and coherence, as well as for
the account of the standard spacetime picture of the world.12 We now turn to the conceptual
9The explanatory structure of the primitive ontology approach is not as simple and straightforward as sometimes
suggested: indeed, the local beables alone cannot ground (‘constitute’) ordinary macroscopic objects and their be-
haviour without taking into account the wave function, which therefore remains a key element in the explanatory
structure (see e.g. Ney and Philipps 2013, §5).
10For a recent collection of papers on the debate between the primitive ontology approach and wave function realism
in QM, see Ney and Albert (2013).
11To the extent that the notion of ‘local beables’ requires an unambiguous notion of localization, a tension may
already arise in the context of classical GR, where there is no external, fixed background with respect to which
physical systems can be unambiguously localized.
12The functionalist strategy investigated in this paper is the kind of “reconstruction project” considered by Healey
(2002) as a way for the contemporary, physics-based Parmenidean to avoid empirical incoherence and self-refutation.
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framework of functionalism that will allow us to do that.
3 Functionalism in philosophy of science and functionalism about
spacetime
Functionalism in philosophy actually designates a variety of different linguistic and metaphysical
conceptions mainly in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of the special sciences, which all
emphasize an understanding of relevant predicates and properties in terms of the role they play in
the context where they are defined. For instance, within such a functionalist framework, a mental
property is determined by its causal role; in fact, it is identified with its causal role within the
network of mental activities. In general, however, functional properties need not be exclusively
characterized in causal terms, even if they typically are so characterized in the cases of mental
properties and special sciences properties; in the context of QG, we need to consider a broader
notion of functional role, one that does not rely on spatiotemporal notions in any way.
The aim is to investigate to what extent certain generic features of functionalism (in its meta-
physical garb) can help us to better grasp the relationship between the more fundamental level of
QG and the smooth spacetime level of GR (and of most of physics). Indeed, in both the philosophy
of mind and the philosophy of the special sciences, the functionalist emphasis on the notion of
functional role alongside the usual notion of composition provides a fruitful understanding of the
links between (allegedly) qualitatively different levels, such as the mental (or biological, chemical,
etc.) level and the physical level.13 Analogously, the issue of the emergence of relativistic spacetime
can be considered from a functionalist perspective on the relationship between (what seems to be)
qualitatively different levels, that is, the non-spatiotemporal level of QG and the spatiotemporal
level of GR.
As a general framework, let us consider the model of functional reduction of higher-level prop-
erties to lower-level ones, as developed in the context of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy
of the special sciences (see for instance Kim 2005, 101f).14 Such a functional reduction typically
involves two mains steps:15
(FR-1) The higher-level properties or entities, which are the target of the reduction, are ‘func-
tionalized’, that is, they are given a functional definition in terms of their causal or functional
role.
(FR-2) An explanation is provided of how the lower-level properties or entities can fill this func-
tional role.
This is very schematic, but the details of particular functional reduction models in the philosophy
of mind and the philosophy of the special sciences are not needed for our present purposes. In
particular, at this stage at least, we need not engage with the consequences of functional reduction
13The functionalist and constitution/composition perspectives can be complementary in certain cases (as arguably
in the context of the special sciences), but stand in opposition in others (as in the context of the emergence of
spacetime).
14At first sight, it might seem a bit awkward to consider a reductionist framework in order to better understand the
emergence of spacetime. Two things on this: first, the aim is to focus on the role of functionalism in the functional
reduction model and second, emergence (at least in a certain sense) and reduction need not stand in opposition, see
Butterfield (2011a,b) and Crowther (2016, §2). In fact, philosophers should take note that when physicists speak of
the “emergence of spacetime” in QG, they do not mean to state that spacetime cannot be ‘reduced’ to the underlying
non-spatiotemporal physics they are proposing.
15Kim (2005, 102) considers three steps; we simply take the third to be part of the second.
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for the general philosophical debate on reductionism. The aim here is first to investigate to what
extent this functionalist scheme can provide a fruitful conceptual framework for understanding the
relationship between smooth spacetime and possible non-spatiotemporal QG entities—most im-
portantly, a conceptual framework where the specific challenges raised by this relationship (such
as empirical incoherence) can be met. Whether and to what extent this relationship should be
qualified as an instance of reduction or emergence in the philosophical sense is a secondary issue in
the QG context; for now, we just highlight the important fact that (as already noted in footnote
14 and following Butterfield 2011a,b) the two need not stand in opposition, so that the relation-
ship encoded by (FR-1) and (FR-2) above may in some circumstance well be one of functional
emergence in that the higher level entities exhibit some novel and robust behaviour relative to the
entities at the more fundamental level.
In the case of the relationship between smooth spacetime and the non-spatiotemporal entities of
QG, a crucial element of this general framework of functional reduction (or functional emergence)
is the ‘functionalization’ of spacetime and spatiotemporal properties: in the first step (FR-1),
spacetime and spatiotemporal properties need to be understood in terms of their functional roles,
so that it can then be shown how the QG entities can fill these functional roles in the second
step (FR-2). As a consequence—and this is a novel perspective brought by this functionalist
framework—the focus not only lies on the QG entities that might give rise to classical spacetime,
but also on classical spacetime itself, which needs to be functionally re-interpreted. More precisely,
this ‘functionalization’ is primarily aimed at the spacetime properties that are relevant for empirical
confirmation, such as spacetime localization. Quite generally, the functional role of spacetime
localization—e.g. the functional role of the property of ‘being located in spacetime region O’—can
be understood in terms of its role in the relevant theoretical structure. We will discuss the specific
functional role of spacetime localization in the dynamical context of GR in more detail in the next
section. Before that, in the remainder of this section, we would like to discuss some general, but
important issues about functional emergence as encoded in (FR-1)–(FR2).
The functional understanding of higher-level properties suggested by (FR-1) allows different
(kinds of) lower-level properties to play the same (kind of) functional role, i.e. different (kinds
of) ‘realizers’ for the same (kind of) higher-level property. This is called ‘multiple realizability’ in
the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of the special sciences, where it constitutes a central
topic—in particular the consequences of multiple realizability for reductionist theories. As already
mentioned above, we are not directly concerned with the philosophical debate on reductionism
here. Whether or not it is compatible with a genuine reduction,16 it is seen in general as a virtue
of functionalism that it allows—indeed, accounts for—multiple realizability.
The liberal attitude of functionalism with respect to what fills the functional roles may raise the
worry that functionalism provides too weak a metaphysical understanding of higher-level properties
in the sense that functional roles may not exhaust the nature of these properties. This general worry
is widespread in the philosophy of mind, where it can take various forms. For example, a forceful
objection considers that functionalist theories do not have the resources to capture the qualitative
and phenomenal aspects (often called ‘qualia’) of certain mental properties (or mental states), e.g.
those linked with conscious experience. Without entering into the details of this hotly debated topic
in the philosophy of mind, the point for our purpose is clear: the worry is that the functionalization
of spacetime properties, as suggested in (FR-1), may leave out crucial (spatiotemporal) aspects of
these properties, rendering the corresponding functional emergence unconvincing and unhelpful, or
at least incomplete (as a consequence, such an account would not bring anything new beyond the
16Again, we tend to side with Butterfield in opposing the general argument from multiple realizability against
reduction (2011a, §4.1.1).
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mere technical consistency constraint and would not be able to meet the philosophical challenges
that are linked to the emergence of spacetime, see section 1).
In order to make the charge more vivid, we can perhaps imagine ‘spacetime zombies’. Suppose
there are two worlds exactly alike in their fundamental substance, the ‘stuff’ they are made out
of, yet they differ in the properties which are exemplified by that stuff in these two cases. In the
first world, just as in ours, the fundamental substance has both non-spatiotemporal as well as spa-
tiotemporal properties. In this world, then, the fundamental substance’s nature directly includes
spatiotemporal qualities and it is therefore no question that we have spacetime. In the second world,
which is an exact duplicate of the first world in all non-spatiotemporal respects, the fundamental
substance does not exemplify spatiotemporal properties. Although the fundamental physics and
all the functionally characterizable spatiotemporal appearances will be identical in the two worlds,
the latter world lacks a decisive spatiotemporal quality and thus merely contains a ‘spacetime zom-
bie’. Since such a spacetime zombie world seems numerically distinct and metaphysically possible,
there must also be directly spatiotemporal properties exemplified in a world which encompasses
spacetime. Thus, in particular, there cannot be a functional reduction of spacetime to something
less than fully spatiotemporal.
It is not clear, however, how much traction the ‘qualia’ concern really gets in the spacetime
case as compared to the philosophy of mind. As Knox (2014) puts it, “[w]here the fan of qualia
has introspection, the fan of the [spacetime] container has only metaphor” (16). The nature and
status of the evidence in favour of qualia may be equivocal, but the alleged ineliminable intrinsically
spatiotemporal but ineffeable quality of a spacetime substance remains positively elusive. What
could remain of that quality once we have accounted for all relevant spatiotemporal features such as
(relative) localization as captured by the relative spatial and temporal order, their metric valuations
in spatial distances and temporal durations, and perhaps more?
A specific version of this worry about functionalism has been raised in the context of wave
function realism (section 2). Ney (2015) argues that, although functionalist accounts “make some
headway in indicating how the wave function may possess some of the features of three-dimensional
objects”, they are “not adequate to demonstrating how the wave function may actually constitute
these types of things” (3116).17 She then considers holograms as an example. The hologram of an
object seems to possess many features of the object it is an hologram of, but that does not entail that
“it actually constitutes” the object in question. Thus, she concludes, what is needed is not just a
compelling account “of how a particular evolving wave function may have features in common with
three-dimensional objects..., but a compelling story as to how a wave function is capable of actually
constituting such objects” (ibid., our emphasis). Ney’s constitution objection (called the “macro-
object problem”) straightforwardly transfers to the QG context: functionalism does not seem to
possess the resources to account for how something non-spatiotemporal can constitute things with
spacetime features, such as being localized in space and time, partly because the functional roles
of the things with spacetime features may not exhaust their (spatiotemporal) nature.
Two interrelated considerations may block this constitution objection in the context of QG.
First, the notion of constitution in the strong (spatiotemporal) sense involved in the objection may
not be needed (and relevant) in this context. Indeed, the framework of QG may well use mereolog-
ical tools without relying on spacetime, and may well appeal to general, non-spatiotemporal com-
positional relations (together with some non-spatiotemporal differentiation of the basic entities of
QG that functionally—and non-spatiotemporally—‘compose’ the things with spacetime features).
Second, functionalism about (standard, smooth) spacetime is committed to the view that there
17Ney (2015) actually defends wave function realism, in particular against the threat of empirical incoherence, by
rejecting the need of local beables for empirical confirmation in the first place. Since her strategy only applies to
space (but not to time, see above section 2), it is not suited to the QG context.
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is nothing about (standard, smooth) spacetime—more precisely: nothing about relevant smooth
spacetime properties—beyond their functional role. Spacetime just is what plays the spacetime
role, faithful to the slogan ‘spacetime is as spacetime does’. As a consequence, anything playing
the right functional role will realize the corresponding spacetime feature or the corresponding spa-
tiotemporal ‘situation’. Even if such a functionalist view of spacetime—of relevant spatiotemporal
features—might sound surprising or unintuitive at first, it must be made clear that there is nothing
incoherent or plainly wrong about it, especially given its strong epistemic anchorage: indeed, we
mainly have epistemic access to physical entities through what they do, which is precisely what
is encoded in their functional role.18 Note that in Ney’s example above, the hologram of an ob-
ject does not fill the right functional role of the object in all its aspects (e.g. it does not interact
with other objects in the right way), hence it does not functionally realize— and so a fortiori not
‘constitute’—the object.
The epistemic relevance of functional roles, including spatiotemporal ones, is central to the
functionalist reply to the challenge of empirical incoherence. The functionalist perspective, and
in particular functional emergence, allows one to preserve—and, to some extent, to ground—the
intuitive epistemic primacy of certain spatiotemporal features or spatiotemporal ‘situations’, such
as a (macro-)object having a certain position in space at a certain time (e.g. a ‘pointer’ in a
measurement context). As a consequence, the argument that empirical confirmation requires certain
spacetime features (such as spacetime localization, local beables) constitutes no threat to theories
‘without spacetime’: as long as the basic entities in QG play the right functional roles (in the right
circumstances), such as that of localization, empirical confirmation just proceeds the usual way in
the context of QG, and empirical coherence is not under threat because spacetime is not part of
the fundamental ontology of the theory. To the extent that this latter is empirically successful (this
is crucial!), the functionalist perspective guarantees that there is no specific reason to be skeptical
or instrumentalist about the theory just because it does not postulate some standard spacetime
structure in its foundations—in other words, the traditional epistemological debate can be held in
the usual way.19
So, from a functionalist point of view, nothing remains beyond showing how the fundamental
degrees of freedom can collectively behave such that they appear spatiotemporal at macroscopic
scales in all relevant and empirically testable ways. This turn out to be a hard task in quantum
gravity. Functionalism can be seen as the assertion that once this task is completed, no unfin-
ished business lingers on. Using a terminology from philosophy of mind, functionalism would then
amount to the denial that there is a ‘hard problem’ beyond the ‘easy problem’ of the emergence of
spacetime.20
Crucial to this functionalist strategy is of course to functionally define the relevant spacetime
features (FR-1), and to show concretely how these functional roles can be filled (FR-2). To
the extent that there is no complete theory of quantum gravity yet, this second step can only be
sketched. The next two sections aim to articulate the main lines of this functionalist strategy in
the concrete cases of two research programs in QG, namely causal set theory (section 4) and loop
quantum gravity (section 5).
18In this perspective, all science is mainly about functional roles; this is clearly expressed by Dennett (2001, 233):
“Functionalism is the idea enshrined in the old proverb: handsome is as handsome does. Matter matters only because
of what matter can do. Functionalism in this broadest sense is so ubiquitous in science that it is tantamount to a
reigning presumption of all science.” All science includes spacetime physics.
19See Lam and Oriti (2018) for a more detailed discussion; thanks to Nick Huggett for valuable exchanges on this
point.
20This distinction was imported into the context of the emergence of spacetime by Le Bihan (2018).
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4 Functional emergence of spacetime in causal set theory
Causal set theory (CST) is founded upon the principle that the fundamental structure underlying
relativistic spacetime is discrete, consists of a partially ordered set of otherwise featureless elemen-
tary events, where the partial order is induced by a relation of causal precedence. It is motivated by
a theorem in GR which was proven in its strongest form by David Malament (1977) and states that
given the causal structure of a causally sufficiently well behaved general-relativistic spacetime, the
dimension, topology, differential structure and metric (up to a conformal factor) of the spacetime
is determined. In other words, in much of GR the causal structure determines the geometry of a
spacetime, but not its ‘size’. It is under the impression of this remarkable theorem that the devel-
opers of CST have made the causal structure the backbone of their approach to QG. More precisely,
the theory contends that the fundamental structure is a causal set C, i.e., an ordered pair 〈C,≺〉
of a set C of events and a relation ≺, which partially orders C.21 Furthermore, it is assumed that
causal sets are discrete structures, i.e., that for all a, c ∈ C, the cardinality of {b ∈ C|a ≺ b ≺ c} is
finite.22 It should be noted at the outset that while the ambition of the program is to produce a
quantum theory of gravity, the theory remains classical to date.
In CST, the fundamental relation is causal, rather than temporal; temporal relations are sup-
posed to emerge from the structure of the causal set.23 So strictly speaking, there is no time in
CST. More impressionistically, ≺ looks like a discrete, (special-)relativistic time without metric
relations such as durations. Space, on the other hand, does not exist in CST. Any subset of events
in any causal set with any claim to represent a spatial slice at a time would have to be such
that its elements are pairwise unrelated by ≺—for otherwise, one of the elements would precede
the other—and thus by construction be utterly structureless: no topological, affine, conformal, let
alone metric structure, and no natural dimensionality. So how does relativistic spacetime emerge
from these structures? Can we precisely state necessary and sufficient conditions for causal sets to
give rise to relativistic spacetimes?
A fully satisfactory answer to this question must cover various aspects. First, it should clarify
what the basic set-up is: are we trying to understand the relationship between theories, or rather
between their models, or some subsets of the set of their models? Also, it is important to deliver not
just conditions necessary for a mathematical derivation, but also sufficient for the demonstration
of the physical salience of the emergence.
So, how should we conceive of the basic situation? The traditional answer in CST proceeds
along the following general recipe. First, we are seeking a mapping from causal sets to relativistic
spacetimes, which formally captures the relation between the former and the latter. More precisely,
we are looking for an injective map ϕ : C →M , where M is the manifold of a relativistic spacetime
〈M, gab〉 with metric gab. The mapping should be such that it becomes evident how the salient
spatiotemporal features of the codomain—the spacetime—arise from the properties of the domain—
the fundamental causal set. It thus relates single models of the two theories and indicates the
direction of their ontological dependence or ground from fundamental to emergent. By mapping
fundamental events into events of the emerging spacetime, it identifies the basal events with some
of the higher-level events. Due to the discreteness of the causal set, almost all of the higher-
level events will not be dignified by being selected as images under ϕ of one of the fundamental
events, and hence the map will be non-surjective. The general idea then is to show how the salient
spatiotemporal or geometrical properties of the specific emergent spacetime at stake are functions
21A partial order is a binary relation defined on a domain, which is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
22For a review on CST, see Sorkin (2005); Dowker (2013); see Wu¨thrich (2012) for a philosophical assessment.
23More precisely, it is a primitive technical relation of causal connectability quite different from the more usual
philosophical understanding of causation.
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of the properties of the specific causal set. In a further step, it has to be shown that this procedure
can generically be applied to the two sets of models from the two theories, i.e., for most physically
reasonable spacetimes we can find a pairing map and articulate how its relevant features arise from
the properties of the underlying causal set. But much more needs to be said about how that is
supposed to work.
Generally, we would expect such a mapping from causal sets to spacetimes to be many-to-
one: each higher-level spatiotemporal property can generally be implemented in many different
fundamental ways, just as in philosophy of mind one would expect mental properties to be multiply
realizable by the grounding physical properties (section 3). Furthermore, we should expect some
corrections to GR; after all, it would be hard to justify replacing GR with a more fundamental theory
if there was no divergence at all between the two theories. For instance, given the antisymmetry
(and the transitivity) of ≺, it may well be that CST only reproduces the sector of GR of spacetimes
without closed timelike curves. Also, models in GR with high energy or matter density such as they
appear in the early universe in the standard model of classical relativistic cosmology may be ruled
out by ‘quantum effects’. In general, one may hope that those sectors of GR containing ‘physically
unreasonable’ spacetime models (such as, e.g., when energy conditions are violated) would not (and
should not) be recoverable from CST.
CST as we have formulated it so far is extremely permissive in that it admits way too many
models which have no prayer of giving raise to a physically reasonable spacetime—or just to a
spacetime for that matter. So some additional conditions need to be imposed on the general set-up
to restrict the class of admissible models adequately. First, causal sets have to be ‘sufficiently large’
to carry enough structure to mimic even just a small piece of continuum spacetime. As Bombelli
et al. (1987) suggest, the causal set has to consist of at least 10130 elements in order to give rise to a
spacetime sufficiently vast to describe our world. However, it turns out that almost all ‘sufficiently
large’ causal sets permitted by the kinematic axiom are so-called ‘KR orders’, i.e., degenerate
partial orders of only three ‘layers’ or ‘generations’ of elements such that all pairs of elements of
subsequent generations stand in ≺. It is clear that such a causal set cannot successfully describe
a realistic spacetime and cannot generically realize the right sort of spacetime functions. The way
causal set theorists have sought to avoid the ‘KR hordes’ is by imposing additional conditions in
the form of ‘dynamical’ rules. Which kind of dynamical rules are most promising remains under
investigation.24 It is at this point that advocates of CST hope to turn their theory into a quantum
theory: these dynamical rules will ultimately have to be appropriately quantum in nature.
Unfortunately, even if the KR catastrophe is avoided, there is no guarantee that the dynam-
ically admissible causal sets will be ‘manifoldlike’, i.e., give rise to manifolds of reasonably low
dimensionality or that is has Lorentz signature or a non-pathological causal structure, and that it
can thus perform the spacetime functions, such as the localization function, required of it. A causal
set thus has to play a ‘manifold functional role’, i.e., it has to play some of the roles the manifold
plays for the smooth spacetime. In other words, it has to be relevantly like a manifold. Thus,
we will call a causal set 〈C,≺〉 manifoldlike just in case it is ‘well approximated’ by a relativistic
spacetime 〈M, gab〉. In order to get any traction, the expression in quotes needs a more rigorous
formulation. The standard way of articulating this idea, which goes back to Bombelli et al. (1987),
uses the notion of ‘faithful embedding’ of a causal set into a spacetime.25 Along these lines, the
24Cf. Rideout and Sorkin (1999) for the most widely discussed approach.
25There are at least two other suggestions for how to address this task. First, as proposed to us in conversation
by David Meyer, one could attempt to define a measure ‘P (C|M)’ to express the probability that a given causal set
〈C,≺〉 arises from random sprinkling into a manifold M , and then use Bayes’s Rule to obtain a probability distribution
P (M |C) for Lorentzian manifolds. This suggestion has not been worked out. Second, as proposed in unpublished
work by Luca Bombelli and Johan Noldus, one could proceed by understanding both causal sets and (future and past
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Figure 1: Finding a map ϕ : C →M such that the image looks like a manifold.
definition can be precisified as follows—cf. also Figure 1:
Definition 1 A causal set 〈C,≺〉 is said to be manifoldlike just in case there exists a ‘faithful
embedding’, i.e., an injective map ϕ : C → M , where M is the manifold of a spacetime 〈M, gab〉,
such that
1. the causal relations are preserved, i.e. ∀a, b ∈ C, a ≺ b if and only if ϕ(a) ∈ J−(ϕ(b));
2. ϕ(C) is a ‘uniformly distributed’ set of points in M ;
3. 〈M, gab〉 does not have ‘structure’ at scales below the mean point spacing.
It should be fairly clear that this is a definition in the functionalist spirit we are invoking: not
the full manifold with its metric structure has to be recovered—the third clause purges the excess
structure of the smooth manifold—, but a sufficiently fine-grained network of events, which correctly
represents the causal structure of the underlying causal set. It is this network that then has to be
shown to be sufficient to perform the spacetime functions required of it.
Suppose now that the causal set at stake is manifoldlike and world enough for our universe. Two
further conditions are necessary to complete the setting. First, causal sets need to be approximated
not just by any spacetime, but by ‘physically reasonable’ relativistic spacetimes. In other words,
the spacetimes entering Definition 1 are sufficiently well-behaved relativistic spacetimes. Second, if
a causal set is approximated by a spacetime, then the approximating spacetime is ‘approximately
unique’. This is what causal set theorists call the “Hauptvermutung” of their programme, and it is
imposed because if one and the same causal set could give rise to distinct spacetimes on different
occasions, we would lose any meaningful way of saying that it emerges from an underlying causal
set. In other words, this condition should ensure that one and the same causal set cannot play
inconsistent spacetime roles. In terms of the above characterization of ‘manifoldlike’, this means,
more precisely, that if two relativistic spacetimes 〈M, gab〉 and 〈M ′, g′ab〉 both approximate a given
causal set in that there exist faithful embeddings ϕ : C → M and ϕ′ : C → M ′, then they are
distinguishing) Lorentzian manifolds as ‘causal measure spaces’ and using a Gromov-Hausdorff function dGH(·, ·) (or
the Gromov-Wasserstein function if we have a probability measure) to give a measure of the closeness or similarity
between such spaces.
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‘approximately isometric’. To demand exact isometry would be too strict, since a causal set with
its ultimately discrete structure should not be held to capture minute metric differences between
the two spacetimes if they are below the scales that could register in the causal set and thus should
be functionally inert. A continuum spacetime contains ‘too much information’, as it were, for a
causal set to be able to fully accommodate that, and more than is needed to execute all relevant
spacetime functions. As the isometry thus does not have to be exact, we should, of course, define
the expression ‘approximately isometric’. We will not attempt this here, but submit that the causal
set programme will have to deliver an appropriate characterization, together with a proof of the
“Hauptvermutung”.
Would the completion of this task fully explain how relativistic spacetimes emerge from causal
sets? No: the only properties of the causal set and the spacetime that the setting has related to
one another so far are their causal structures, which have to be essentially the same. Malament’s
theorem is a theorem of GR, but not of CST. Although it provided essential motivation, we cannot
just assume that the causal structure and the discreteness at the fundamental level give us a full-
fledged emerging spacetime. We insist, however, that it is not necessary that the fundamental
causal set possesses, in a narrow and literal sense, spatial or temporal properties. Instead, we
maintain that in order to establish the emergence of relativistic spacetimes from causal sets, it is
sufficient to complete the two tasks outlined in section 3. In the terms used there, it first must
be determined which are the ‘spatiotemporally salient’ aspects of a high-level structure that need
to be accounted for, and hence functionalized (FR-1). These aspects are geometric and include
spatiotemporal localization, spatial distance, temporal duration, topology, and similar aspects of
the geometry of spacetime. At the second step of the functional reduction, (FR-2), one needs to
show how the fundamental entities can fill these geometric roles. The mapping sought after in the
preceding paragraph forms part of this second step. Importantly, what any such ‘derivation’ needs
to get right are only the functionally relevant features of relativistic spacetimes. Although there
is no guarantee that all these features can be recovered, the preservation of the causal structure is
imposed upon those embeddings precisely in order to secure this.
So how can we extract geometric information from the fundamental causal sets such that this
information can then be used to relate them to the smooth spacetime of GR, thus exemplifying the
functional reduction we are arguing for? In order to complete this task in practice, some concrete
means of extracting such information must be constructed. Much work has been done in this
direction, and it continues to be an active research area. For instance, researchers have attempted
to define the spatial topologies and spacelike distances in terms native to the fundamental causal
set, showing that at least in some contexts these topologies and distances closely correspond to the
relevant aspects of relativistic spacetimes in which these causal sets can be embedded.26
As an illustration of functional reduction in CST, let us consider dimension. Dimension, ar-
guably and in response to step (FR-1), is functionally relevant for instance through its many
appearances in emergent dynamical patterns which are encoded in the laws of non-fundamental
theories, such as Newton’s law of universal gravitation. How can we identify some property or
combination of properties of the underlying causal set that would be indicative of the dimensional-
ity of the ‘smallest’ manifold into which it can be faithfully embedded? The standard definition of
the ‘dimension’ of a partial order such as a causal set defines it as the minimum integer n such that
the partially ordered set can be embedded in Rn with the so-called ‘coordinate order’, i.e. with the
ordering relation ≤ which obtains between points in Rn just in case their standard coordinates all
satisfy the usual ‘less or equal’ relation (Brightwell 1997). This recipe yields a natural number n
26Major et al. (2006, 2007) construct a spatial topology by ‘thickening’ the ‘spatial’ antichains of a causal set, i.e.,
subsets of events which are pairwise incomparable, and exploiting the arising causal structure; Rideout and Wallden
(2009) offer the most penetrating analysis for the case of spacelike distances.
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as a candidate for the dimension of the emerging spacetime. However, although perhaps intuitive,
this notion of dimension is in general hard to compute, only gives a very weak upper bound and,
most importantly, is not straightforwardly transferable to the case of embeddings into relativistic
spacetimes. In order to overcome that deficiency, one can introduce the ‘Minkowski dimension, i.e.,
the dimension of the lowest-dimensional Minkowski space into which a causal set can be embed-
ded (Meyer 1988). Analytically unresolvable, mathematicians have developed promising numerical
methods to estimate the Minkowski dimension of causal sets based on properties of the fundamental
structure alone. If thoroughly successful, this would complete step (FR-2).
The question of how a fundamental causal set can give rise to the dimension of an emerging
space thus finds a functional resolution. Similar stories can be told regarding some other geometric
properties of spacetimes,27 though we certainly do not pretend that a functional reduction of
relativistic spacetimes to causal sets is almost accomplished or imminent. Much work remains to
be done. But what we do want to insist on is that it is precisely this kind of work that needs to be
completed, and nothing else on top. Once all features of spacetimes as identified in step (FR-1),
such as dimension in the example above, have been given a functional understanding in a second
step (FR-2), the emergence of relativistic spacetimes from an underlying quantum-gravitational
structure has been achieved. Let us turn to our second illustration.
5 Functional emergence of spacetime in loop quantum gravity
At the heart of the research program in loop quantum gravity (LQG) lies the dynamical nature
of spacetime as encoded in GR: the received view (at least from the perspective of LQG) is that
the spacetime metric and the gravitational field are aspects of the same dynamical structure, and,
as a consequence, there is no external, fixed, non-dynamical background with respect to which
physical entities can be dynamically considered (the diffeomorphism invariance of the theory is
taken to reflect this dynamical nature).28 To some extent, the dynamical nature of spacetime can
be considered as the root of the ‘disappearance of spacetime’ in QG (at least in the QG approaches,
such as LQG, that take this dynamical nature of spacetime seriously): to the spacetime (metric)
structure of the classical theory corresponds a quantum structure at the quantum (gravitational)
level—since it is a dynamical entity—whose features make any (standard) spacetime interpretation
difficult.
Now, the interesting thing is that the dynamical nature of spacetime explicitly suggests a func-
tional understanding of certain crucial spacetime features already at the classical (GR) level—in
particular, spacetime localization—thereby motivating the functional emergence framework. In-
deed, a radical consequence of spacetime itself being dynamical is that spacetime localization at
the classical level amounts to localization with respect to a dynamical entity that has no privileged
dynamical status in general. This seems to imply that localization, which plays such a central role
for the issue of empirical coherence (see section 1),29 may primarily be understood as relational
and dynamical rather than fundamentally spatiotemporal: localization in this GR sense is to be
27For a more detailed discussion also of the cases of spatial distance and topology, cf. Huggett and Wu¨thrich (ming,
Ch. 3).
28Many physicists at the origin of the LQG program have emphasized the importance of this dynamical under-
standing of spacetime (and the related notion of ‘background independence’) at the classical GR level, in particular
for the foundations of LQG—Carlo Rovelli perhaps more prominently than anyone else (see his 2004 textbook on
LQG). This received view can be qualified in different ways, which need not concern us here.
29That it plays such a central role is the reason why we mainly focus on the functional emergence of spacetime
localization here; however, ultimately, one would also need to show how other spacetime features relevant for the
issue of empirical coherence functionally emerge in the appropriate way.
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understood in terms of the (cor)relations among the dynamical entities of the theory rather than
with respect to some fixed, non-dynamical spacetime background.30 This suggests a functional
understanding of localization in the sense of certain functional relationships being satisfied.
The definition of physical (gauge-, diffeomorphism-invariant) ‘coordinates’ in GR nicely illus-
trates this functional understanding of localization. Physical localization can be defined with re-
spect to four independent scalar functionals φK [g] (K = 1, . . . , 4) of the gravitational field. These
scalar functionals play the role of physical coordinates with respect to which physical entities can be
localized (they play the ‘localizing role’ of spacetime points).31 For instance, in this dynamical (and
diffeomorphism-invariant) perspective, a physical field F is not genuinely localized with respect to
some fixed spacetime background: strictly speaking, F (x), x ∈ M , where M is a spacetime man-
ifold, does not represent any physical event, since it is not diffeomorphism- (or gauge-) invariant,
and so does not express any genuine spacetime localization. The physical field F is rather localized
with respect to other dynamical fields: F (φK), which is diffeomorphism- (or gauge-) invariant, pri-
marily encodes a dynamical and functional notion of localization, in the sense of certain functional
relationships between dynamical entities. As such, these functional relationships are not inherently
spatiotemporal.32 In the schematic terms of the functional emergence framework proposed in sec-
tion 3, these relationships can actually be understood as functionally defining the (‘higher-level’,
GR) property of ‘being localized in a certain spacetime region’, thereby providing an instance of
how the first step (FR-1) can be implemented.
To the extent that localization can be implemented in various ways within GR—with respect
to different dynamical entities, none being privileged in principle—the corresponding functional
definition can take various forms.33 The ‘localizing function’ in these different instantiations involves
at its core the notions of coincidence and contiguity: the functional role of localizing a physical
entity (what it means for a physical entity to be localized) crucially involves coincidence and
contiguity relations.34 As a consequence, in schematic terms, the second step (FR-2) crucially
involves how LQG entities (or LQG properties) can instantiate coincidence and contiguity relations
in an appropriate context.
At the kinematical level, the fundamental LQG entities are described by spin network states,
which form a basis of the relevant kinematical Hilbert space of LQG.35 They correspond to quantum
states of (3-)space (regions) and of the (3-)gravitational field. Spin network states are represented
30Rovelli (1999) highlights the conceptual novelty of this dynamical notion of localization within GR.
31These physical coordinates (sometimes called ‘pseudo-coordinates’ to distinguish them from mere mathematical
coordinates) have been originally defined in the context of generic (i.e. without non-trivial symmetries) pure gravi-
tational (i.e. vacuum) solutions of the Einstein field equations (e.g. see Komar 1958), but the idea could in principle
be extended to generic solutions with matter.
32Although this dynamical conception of localization seems to naturally suggest a relationalist ontology at the
classical GR level, it does not rule out substantivalism, since the scalar fields φK are functionals of the metric and
can therefore be understood as encoding the spacetime structure (i.e., they may receive a spacetime interpretation).
However, this debate is secondary for the aim of this paper: whatever is the preferred spacetime ontology at the
classical level, localization in the GR context can be functionally understood, and as such this very functional
understanding does not involve spacetime notions (in gauge-theoretic terms, it amounts to a ‘gauge fixing’, see
Earman 2002, fn 22).
33For instance, the dynamical ‘localizing role’ can be instantiated in principle by different specific (non-degenerate)
matter distributions within GR (such as matter scalar fields).
34This has been clearly underlined by Einstein (1916) and his discussion of “space-time coincidences”; more re-
cently, see Rovelli’s emphasis on the notion of contiguity for the GR (dynamical) understanding of localization (e.g.
Rovelli 1999). Furthermore, Rovelli and Vidotto (2015, §2.4.3) discuss an interesting analogy between contiguity and
interaction, suggesting the idea, to which we will return below, that QG interactions can give rise to—can play the
role of —spatiotemporal contiguity in appropriate circumstances.
35Since, for the time being, LQG is better developed and understood at the kinematical level, part of the discussion
is focused on this level. Dynamical aspects are considered later in this section.
16
by combinatorial graphs carrying irreducible group (SU(2)) representations on their links and
nodes. A crucial aspect of the physical relevance of the spin network states comes from the fact
that they are eigenstates of the area and volume operators (built from the classical geometrical ex-
pressions), which turn out to have discrete spectra. This result is naturally interpreted as encoding
some fundamental discreteness: the spectral analysis of these operators suggests that the nodes
of the spin networks represent ‘quanta of volume’ (or ‘atoms of space’)36 and the links represent
‘quanta of area’. Although radically different from the continuous spacetime structure of GR, this
fundamental discreteness does not, as such, preclude any spatiotemporal interpretation at the LQG
level, although some properties of relativistic spacetimes such as their smoothness are definitely
lost. In particular, the links can be naturally understood as instantiating contiguity relations (also
called ‘adjacency relations’) between the ‘atoms of space’.37
This spacetime understanding actually runs into difficulties because of two further important
features of LQG. First, generic LQG states are quantum superpositions of spin network states,
so that generic states are not associated with a single discrete structure, but with a superposition
thereof, making any straightforward spacetime interpretation difficult. Second, the fundamental ad-
jacency relations represented by the spin network links need not—and in general do not—correspond
to spatiotemporal, metrical contiguity in the standard GR sense: two connected nodes at the LQG
level may correspond to events in GR spacetime that are arbitrarily far away (in the GR metric
sense) from one another.38 In this perspective, the fundamental spin network connectivity cannot
be directly interpreted in standard spatiotemporal terms; most importantly, it does not give rise
at the LQG level to any notions of localization and locality that come close to the standard ones—
the ones that are so central in the threat of empirical incoherence and in the argument for local
beables. In functionalist terms, the standard ‘localizing function’ is not instantiated at the LQG
level in general. Now, the crucial point is to show that spin networks can play a localizing role
in the standard sense, in particular at the GR level: the higher-level property of ‘being localized
in a certain spacetime region’ (in the standard, GR sense) will then be considered to functionally
emerge from the LQG properties of spin networks.
From a technical point of view, understanding how a standard notion of spatiotemporal locality
may arise from the fundamental LQG description is part of the general issue of the classical limit
of the theory, which still remains one of the key open problems of LQG. Moreover, to the extent
that it is a quantum theory, a full understanding of the classical limit of LQG ultimately requires
addressing the quantum measurement problem. Our aim here is neither to address the technical
difficulties linked to the classical limit of LQG nor to take a stance on the measurement problem.39
Rather, the aim is to show how a functionalist perspective can alleviate the specific conceptual
difficulties related to the emergence of the standard notions of space and time from a fundamental
36There are various reasons for being very cautious with this evocative analogy about ‘atoms of space’ or ‘atoms
of spacetime’, see below and section 6.
37See Rovelli (2004, 189): “Two chunks of space are contiguous if the corresponding nodes are connected by a link
l. In this case, there is an elementary surface separating them [. . . ] The graph Γ of the spin network determines
the adjacency relation between chunks of space.” However, Rovelli (2011, §D) warns that the geometrical (and
spatiotemporal) picture of the discrete structures associated with spin networks “should not be taken too literally”,
since there are different, not necessarily ontologically equivalent, geometrical understandings of spin networks. Cf.
also Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013, §2.3), Lam and Esfeld (2013, §2.2) and Wu¨thrich (2017, §2) for a discussion on
the ways in which spin networks are less than fully spatiotemporal.
38This feature is called ‘disordered locality’, see Markopoulou and Smolin (2007), as well as Smolin (2009, §28.5.3)
and references therein; for a philosophical discussion, see again Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013, §2.3) and Wu¨thrich
(2017, §2.1).
39To some extent, the measurement problem needs to be addressed for a quantum theory to have a clear ontology;
in particular, the precise ontological meaning of quantum superpositions will depend on one’s stance with respect to
the measurement problem.
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level where they may be absent.
In order to discuss a concrete example, we apply this functionalist perspective to the so-called
‘weave state approach’ to the classical limit.40 Weave states are specific (‘semi-classical’) spin
network states that have a large-scale classical (spatiotemporal) behaviour in a precise sense: they
are eigenstates of the geometrical (volume, area) operators with eigenvalues approximating the
corresponding classical values as determined by the classical metric. In more technical terms, a
spin network state |S〉 is a weave state for a classical (3-)metric g, if we have, at a scale l Planck
length lP and for a sufficiently large 2-surface S and a sufficiently large 3-region R, and up to small
corrections of the order O(lP /l) (Rovelli 2004, §6.7.1):
Aˆ(S) |S〉 = (A[g,S] +O(lP /l)) |S〉 ,
Vˆ(R) |S〉 = (V[g,R] +O(lP /l)) |S〉
(1)
where Aˆ(S) and Vˆ(R) are the area and volume operators corresponding to S and R, and A[g,S] =∫ |d2S| and V[g,R] = ∫ |d3R| are the classical area and volume as determined by the classical
metric g. Now, in a functionalist perspective, the spin network state |S〉 instantiates the metrical
function—plays the metrical role—of the (classical) volume V and area A in the appropriate regime
(at a large scale and for a large region R and a large surface S) in the sense that it determines the
same volume V and area A as the classical metric g.41
This functionalist understanding naturally accounts for the fact that (1) does not determine |S〉
uniquely: since (1) only puts a constraint on properties averaged over a large region and a large
surface (compared to the length scale l), many different spin network states can play the same
‘averaged’ metrical role. From a functionalist point of view, this seems at first sight akin to a case
of multiple realizability (see section 3), where different lower-level properties—here, represented by
the spin network states—can play the same functional role, that is, can instantiate the same higher-
level properties—here, classical volume and area. However, the standard philosophical notion of
multiple realizability involves multiple realization by different types (kinds) of physical states or
properties or configurations; and here it is not clear to what extent we really have different types
of LQG configurations—different types of spin network sates—differently realizing the same type
of metrical function.42
The important point for our discussion is that this functionalist perspective provides a clear
(namely, functional) sense in which metrical (and more generally, spatiotemporal) properties can
emerge in principle from a non-metrical (non-spatiotemporal) level: the (non-metrical) spin network
states of the lower level of LQG can play certain metrical functional roles at the higher level of GR
(in the appropriate regime), e.g. as encoded in (1).43
Classical relativistic spacetime (or the classical metric) has of course many different functional
roles, but not all these roles may be instantiated by the lower-level properties of LQG, or at least
40As we will briefly mention below, the general conceptual framework of functionalism applies to other approaches
to the classical limit as well, e.g. in terms of coherent states; it may also be relevant in the case where spacetime
features may arise in the continuum or thermodynamic (rather than classical) limit (Oriti 2014).
41Cf. Wu¨thrich (2017, §4.2) for a more detailed account.
42We are grateful to Nick Huggett for highlighting this point to us; see Lam and Oriti (2018) for a more detailed
discussion.
43The metrical meaning encoded in (1) actually depends on the interpretation of quantum operators (observables)
in general, that is, ultimately on the solution to the measurement problem that is privileged; e.g. Bohmians and
Everettians (whatever their conceptions precisely amounts to in the QG context) do not attribute the same meaning
to (1). We believe that the broad functionalist framework suggested here can be further specified in the context of
the different ontological stances one can have with respect to the quantum formalism and the measurement problem:
this is because the functionalist perspective on the emergence of spacetime does neither rely on, nor exhaust, the
exact ontological nature of the lower level of LQG.
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not directly. This is crucially illustrated by the issue of disordered locality (see footnote 38) at
the semi-classical level. Indeed, the conditions (1) defining weave states do not preclude any mis-
match between spin network connectivity at the LQG level and standard spacetime locality at
the GR level (Markopoulou and Smolin 2007). If this mismatch is sufficiently drastic for some
weave state/spacetime pair, then this weave state would not instantiate any standard ‘localizing
function’, while still playing the metrical roles of volume and area as encoded in (1). Most im-
portantly, standard (‘spatiotemporal’) locality would then not be instantiated and the threat of
empirical incoherence would arise, since the theory would not be able to account for the local
beables that ground our experimental evidence. From a functionalist perspective, the threat of em-
pirical incoherence would arise in such a case not because of some in principle conceptual problems
linked to the emergence of spacetime from a non-spatiotemporal level, but rather because the right
functional role—namely, the localizing function—is not instantiated. Indeed, it is expected that
disordered locality is rather mild for (single) weave states, so that these latter actually do play the
right localizing role at the higher level of GR, thereby avoiding the threat of empirical incoherence.
Again, the functionalist framework naturally accounts for the fact that different weave states with
various configurations of (mild) disordered locality can play the same localizing role: novel (ulti-
mately local!) empirical predictions may actually arise from this (mild) disordered locality (such
as predictions of the fluctuations in the cosmic microwave background, among others; see Smolin
2009, §28.5.3 and §28.5.4).44
So far we have only considered the kinematical part of LQG, which is better developed and
understood; according to the standard understanding of the theory, this means that we have only
been concerned with the (functional) emergence of space rather than spacetime. We conclude this
section with a few remarks about the dynamical part of the theory and the (functional) emergence
of spacetime.
In its canonical setting, the dynamics of LQG is encoded in the so-called Hamiltonian constraint
(the LQG counterpart of the infamous Wheeler-DeWitt equation), whose definition is extremely
tricky and for which no complete solution has been found so far (these difficulties partly find their
roots in the fact that there is no external time parameter with respect to which the dynamics
unfolds—hence the claims about the absence of time at the LQG level). Dynamical generalizations
of spin networks in a covariant setting—the so-called ‘spin foams’—are increasingly being studied as
an alternative approach to the dynamics of LQG. Indeed, spin foams can be intuitively understood
as higher-dimensional (Feynman-like) graphs (‘2-complexes’) describing the ‘evolution’ of spin net-
works (‘1-complexes’). The dynamics is then understood in terms of transition amplitudes—more
precisely: sums over spin foam amplitudes—between spin networks (or for single ‘boundary’ spin
networks).
Spin foams resist any standard spacetime interpretation for reasons very similar to the ones
invoked for spin networks.45 The functionalist perspective discussed above in the context of the
44As already mentioned above, the low-energy limit of LQG is still far from being fully understood; indeed, many
technical difficulties remain. For instance, single weave states are very specific semi-classical states; since quantum
superposition is a generic feature of any quantum theory, superpositions of semi-classical states are actually to be
expected, in particular with consequences for (disordered) locality. It has been suggested that decoherence effects may
play a role here (with certain LQG degrees of freedom considered as ‘environmental’, see the philosophical discussion
in Wu¨thrich 2017, §4.2), but concrete implementations and control over quantum corrections are still wanting. These
are technical and empirical issues that need to be further investigated. Functionalism obviously does not aim at
addressing them, but rather aim at providing a clear conceptual framework for the emergence claims.
45There is actually a deep analogy between (single) spin foams and Feynman graphs, where any (discrete) spacetime
picture attached to (single) spin foams have much the same ‘virtual’ status as the geometrical picture of Feynman
graphs (away from the classical limit; see the philosophical discussion in Lam and Esfeld 2013, §2.2). This Feynman
analogy is exploited in the framework of group field theory (GFT), which is a quantum field theory (QFT) over a
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classical limit of spin network states (in terms of weave states) applies equally well to the classical
limit of spin foam amplitudes (in terms of coherent states, see Rovelli and Vidotto 2015, Ch. 8):46
in the classical limit, spin foams play the spacetime role of a Regge (simplicial) discretization, that
is, play the role—in particular, the localizing role—of a spacetime lattice, very much like in lattice
field theory. Of course, the crucial difference with standard lattice field theory is that dynamical
entities (spin foams), which do not themselves explicitly possess standard spatiotemporal properties,
play the role—in particular, the localizing role—of the spacetime lattice in the appropriate regime
(localization is then dynamically and functionally instantiated in the sense that the right functional
relationships among dynamical entities are instantiated).47
Similarly to the spin network case, the strength of this functionalist perspective on the emer-
gence of standard spacetime comes from the flexibility with respect to what exactly instantiates
the relevant spacetime roles. There are two aspects to this flexibility. First, it allows for rel-
evant spacetime roles to be instantiated by different spin foams, which may differ with respect
to other spacetime aspects (functions), in particular leaving room for new predictions (see the
issue of disordered locality above). Second, the spacetime functional roles may not exhaust the
nature of the entities (e.g. spin networks, spin foams) that instantiate these roles, leaving room
for further metaphysical work based on the future developments of the theory. Indeed, if there
is nothing about (classical, standard) spacetime (at the GR level) beyond the relevant spacetime
functional roles (‘spacetime is as spacetime does’), it might well be the case that the fundamental
QG structures possess other features (besides being spacetime realizers) as captured by the (fu-
ture) QG theories; in order to be considered as empirically meaningful—as physical as opposed
to ‘merely’ mathematical—these (non-spatio-temporal) features must have some bearing on (some
of) the relevant spacetime functional roles that are instantiated by the QG structures in the right
circumstances (for example, non-geometrical phases being related to geometrical ones through some
phase transition, e.g. see Oriti 2014, Lam and Oriti 2018).
6 Conclusions
Functionalism in the context of the emergence of spacetime in quantum gravity can be characterized
as a rejection of the demand that more is needed—beyond empirical success—than showing how
the fundamental structure, whatever it may turn out to be, can fulfill the role or the function of
spacetime, by showing how it can give rise to all the relevant properties of space and time. We
believe that to date, no research program in quantum gravity has shown this. However, in order to
progress on that task, it is also important to recognize just what it is that needs to be established.
The central claim of this essay asserts that to require that the proposed reductions somehow show
how some ill-defined qualitative features of spacetime are obtained from the fundamental non-
spatiotemporal ontology, or even insist that such a reduction of spacetime ‘qualia’ is in principle
impossible, is misguided. Instead, it suffices to identify those aspects of spacetime which are
necessary to support the physics we do and the world as we experience it, and then show how
these arise, at least to a well-controlled approximation, from the fundamental physics of quantum
gravity.
From a metaphysical point of view, the functionalist perspective articulated in this article can
group manifold—in some sense, a kind of QFT of spin networks (see Oriti 2014, Lam and Oriti 2018).
46As in the spin network case, the classical limit scheme here still faces many issues—see footnotes 43 and 44.
47The Regge (simplicial) discretization then converges to classical relativistic spacetimes in the continuum limit.
Note that it is important to distinguish the two kinds of limits (classical and continuum) here; in particular, it might
be the case that the two do not commute and that interesting (spatiotemporal?) properties emerge in the continuum
or thermodynamic limit of LQG or GFT (again, see Oriti 2014; see also Rovelli and Vidotto 2015, 13.2).
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be understood as a move away from the ‘constitution’ or ‘building blocks’ heuristics according to
which, in the case of quantum gravity, spacetime and spatiotemporal entities are constituted by, or
made up from, quantum gravitational building blocks. The primitive ontology (or local beables)
approach to the ontology of quantum mechanics is a paradigmatic example of this heuristics at work
in a context other than quantum gravity. However valuable for physical and metaphysical theoriz-
ing in other contexts, this heuristics acts, when taken too seriously in the present context, as the
source of conceptual worries concerning the constitution of spacetime and spatiotemporal entities
from non-spatiotemporal, and hence qualitatively improper, elements.48 In particular, one might
think, based on this constitution heuristics, that theories of quantum gravity face an irresolvable
problem of empirical incoherence which could only be addressed by admitting appropriately local-
ized entities into one’s fundamental ontology. We have argued that this heuristics is misguided,
as the relationship between spatiotemporal and quantum gravitational structures is best under-
stood in terms of some relevant functional (rather than constitutive) roles these latter instantiate
in appropriate circumstances. Spacetime is as spacetime does. No more, no less.
References
Albert, D. Z. (1996). Elementary quantum metaphysics. In Cushing, J., Fine, A., and Goldstein,
S., editors, Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, pages 277–284. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Albert, D. Z. (2013). Wave function realism. In Ney, A. and Albert, D. Z., editors, The Wave
Function: Essays in the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics. New York: Oxford University
Press, 52-57.
Albert, D. Z. (2015). After Physics. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Allori, V., Goldstein, S., Tumulka, R., and Zangh`ı, N. (2008). On the common structure of Bohmian
mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
59:353–389.
Allori, V., Goldstein, S., Tumulka, R., and Zangh`ı, N. (2011). Many worlds and Schro¨dinger’s first
quantum theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62:1–27.
Bell, J. S. (1987). Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bombelli, L., Lee, J., Meyer, D., and Sorkin, R. D. (1987). Space-time as a causal set. Physical
Review Letters, 59:521–524.
Brightwell, G. (1997). Partial orders. In Beineke, L. W. and Wilson, R. J., editors, Graph Con-
nections: Relationships between Graph Theory and other Areas of Mathematics, pages 52–69.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Brown, H. (2006). Physical Relativity: Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Butterfield, J. (2011a). Emergence, reduction and supervenience: A varied landscape. Foundations
of Physics, 41:920–959.
48We believe this heuristics is also partly behind the physicists’ somewhat loose talk about the ‘atoms of spacetime’
in quantum gravity.
21
Butterfield, J. (2011b). Less is different: Emergence and reduction reconciled. Foundations of
Physics, 41:1065–1135.
Chalmers, D. (2012). Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crowther, K. (2016). Effective Spacetime: Understanding Emergence in Effective Field Theory and
Quantum Gravity. Springer, Cham.
Dennett, D. (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition, 79:221–237.
Dowker, F. (2013). Introduction to causal sets and their phenomenology. General Relativity and
Gravitation, 45:1651–1667.
Earman, J. (2002). Thoroughly Modern McTaggart: or, what McTaggart would have said if he
had read the general theory of relativity. Philosophers’ Imprint, 2(3).
Einstein, A. (1916). Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie. Annalen der Physik,
49:769–822.
Healey, R. (2002). Can physics coherently deny the reality of time? Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplement, 50:293–316.
Huggett, N. and Wu¨thrich, C. (2013). Emergent spacetime and empirical (in)coherence. Studies
in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 44:276–285.
Huggett, N. and Wu¨thrich, C. (forthcoming). Out of Nowhere: The Emergence of Spacetime in
Quantum Theories of Gravity. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism or Something Near Enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Knox, E. (2013). Effective spacetime geometry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics, 44:346–356.
Knox, E. (2014). Spacetime structuralism or spacetime functionalism? Manuscript.
Knox, E. (2017). Physical relativity from a functionalist perspective. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.09.008.
Komar, A. (1958). Construction of a complete set of independent observables in the general theory
of relativity. Physical Review, 111:1182–1187.
Lam, V. (2015). Quantum structure and spacetime. In Bigaj, T. and Wu¨thrich, C., editors,
Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, pages 209–228. New York: Rodopi.
Lam, V. and Esfeld, M. (2013). A dilemma for the emergence of spacetime in canonical quantum
gravity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 44:286–293.
Lam, V. and Oriti, D. (2018). Philosophical Challenges for Space and Time in Quantum Gravity.
Cham: Springer.
Le Bihan, B. (2018). Priority monism beyond spacetime. Metaphysica.
Major, S., Rideout, D., and Surya, S. (2007). On recovering continuum topology from a causal set.
Journal of Mathematical Physics, 48:032501.
22
Major, S. A., Rideout, D., and Surya, S. (2006). Spatial hypersurfaces in causal set cosmology.
Classical and Quantum Gravity, 23(14):4743.
Malament, D. (1977). The class of continuous timelike curves determines the topology of spacetime.
Journal of Mathematical Physics, 18:1399–1404.
Markopoulou, F. and Smolin, L. (2007). Disordered locality in loop quantum gravity states. Clas-
sical and Quantum Gravity, 24:3813–3823.
Maudlin, T. (2007). Completeness, supervenience and ontology. Journal of Physics A, 40:3151–
3171.
Maudlin, T. (2010). Can the world be only wavefunction? In Saunders, S., Barrett, J., Kent, A.,
and Wallace, D., editors, Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality, pages 121–143.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Meyer, D. A. (1988). The Dimension of Causal Sets. Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Ney, A. (2015). Fundamental physical ontologies and the contraint of empirical coherence: a defense
of wave function realism. Synthese, 192:3105–3124.
Ney, A. and Albert, D. Z., editors (2013). The Wave Function: Essays in the Metaphysics of
Quantum Mechanics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ney, A. and Philipps, K. (2013). Does an adequate physical theory demand a primitive ontology?
Philosophy of Science, 80:454–474.
Oriti, D. (2014). Disappearance and emergence of space and time in quantum gravity. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 46:186–199.
Rideout, D. and Sorkin, R. D. (1999). A classical sequential growth dynamics for causal sets.
Physical Review D, 61:024002.
Rideout, D. and Wallden, P. (2009). Spacelike distance from discrete causal order. Classical and
Quantum Gravity, 26(15):155013.
Rovelli, C. (1999). ‘Localization’ in quantum field theory: how much of QFT is compatible with
what we know about space-time? In Cao, T. Y., editor, Conceptual foundations of quantum field
theory, pages 207–232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rovelli, C. (2004). Quantum Gravity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rovelli, C. (2011). A new look at loop quantum gravity. Classical and Quantum Gravity, 28:114005.
Rovelli, C. and Vidotto, F. (2015). Covariant Loop Quantum Gravity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Smolin, L. (2009). Generic predictions of quantum theories of gravity. In Oriti, D., editor, Ap-
proaches to Quantum Gravity, pages 548–570. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sorkin, R. (2005). Causal sets: discrete gravity. In Gomberoff, A. and Marolf, D., editors, Proceed-
ings of the Valdivia Summer School. Plenum Press, New York.
23
Wallace, D. (2012). The Emergent Multiverse. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wu¨thrich, C. (2012). The structure of causal sets. Journal for General Philosophy of Science,
43:223–241.
Wu¨thrich, C. (2017). Raiders of the lost spacetime. In Lehmkuhl, D., Schiemann, G., and Scholz,
E., editors, Towards a Theory of Spacetime Theories, pages 307–345. Basel: Birkha¨user.
Yates, D. (forthcoming). Thinking about spacetime. In Wu¨thrich, C., Le Bihan, B., and Huggett,
N., editors, Philosophy Beyond Spacetime. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
24
